The morning read for Tuesday, Jan. 18

The morning read for Tuesday, Jan. 18

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Each weekday, we select a short list of news articles, commentary, and other noteworthy links related to the Supreme Court. To suggest a piece for us to consider, email us at roundup@scotusblog.com.

Here’s the Tuesday morning read:

The post The morning read for Tuesday, Jan. 18 appeared first on SCOTUSblog.

from SCOTUSblog https://www.scotusblog.com/2022/01/the-morning-read-for-tuesday-jan-18/
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Boston’s refusal to fly a Christian flag over city hall raises First Amendment questions

Boston’s refusal to fly a Christian flag over city hall raises First Amendment questions

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When it hears oral argument on Tuesday in Shurtleff v. City of Boston, the Supreme Court will return to the role of religion in public spaces. The question comes to the court in an important free speech case arising from Boston’s practice of allowing outside groups to fly their flags on one of the three flagpoles in front of city hall. A group that was denied permission to fly a “Christian flag” there contends that the city’s policy unconstitutionally silences unpopular speech, while the city counters that it needs the ability to decide what messages it conveys through the flags that fly on its flagpoles.

The city normally flies the same three flags on the flagpoles: the American flag and the POW/MIA flag on one flagpole, the Massachusetts flag on the second flagpole, and its own flag on the third. Occasionally, however, the city will grant a request to swap out another flag for its own. Over the past 12 years, it has flown the flag of other countries (including China and Cuba), as well as flags for groups such as Boston Pride (an LGBTQ group) and the National Juneteenth Observance Foundation.

The case before the court on Tuesday arose in 2017, when Harold Shurtleff applied to fly a “Christian flag,” bearing a cross, on the third flagpole in connection with an event that he wanted to hold on the plaza in front of city hall. The flag represents Camp Constitution, the group that he founded that seeks “to enhance understanding of the country’s Judeo-Christian moral heritage.” The city denied Shurtleff’s initial request, and it didn’t respond to a second request.

mostly white flag with red cross surrounded by blue square in upper left quadrant

The Camp Constitution flag.

Shurtleff sued the city in federal court, arguing that the city’s rejection of his request violated Camp Constitution’s right to free speech and the Constitution’s establishment clause, which bars the city both from favoring one religion at the expense of another and from preferring religion over nonreligion. A federal district court ruled for the city, and the U.S. Court of Appeals upheld that ruling. It reasoned that flying other groups’ flags on the city’s flagpole amounted to speech by the city, which allows it to choose which flags it wants to fly without being subject to discrimination claims. The court of appeals ruled that the city’s rejection of Shurtleff’s request also did not violate the establishment clause. Shurtleff came to the Supreme Court in June 2021, asking the justices to weigh in, which they agreed to do.

In his brief on the merits, Shurtleff contends that because the city has opened up the flagpoles for private flag raisings, the flagpoles are not speech by the city but instead a “public forum,” where the government can’t impose restrictions based on the speaker’s viewpoint. Restrictions based on the content of the speech in a public forum, Shurtleff adds, must pass the most stringent constitutional test, known as strict scrutiny.

When the city rejected Shurtleff’s request to raise Camp Constitution’s flag only because it was called a “Christian” flag, he argues, it discriminated against Shurtleff and Camp Constitution based on their viewpoint and based on the content of their speech. The city cannot excuse its exclusion of the flag on the ground that it was trying to avoid violating the establishment clause, he observes. The establishment clause, he stresses, only prohibits government speech endorsing religion, not private speech. And the private flags on the city’s flagpoles cannot be (contrary to the 1st Circuit’s ruling) government speech, he suggests: The city did not review any of the 284 other private flags that were raised on the third flagpole, much less exercise the kind of direct and effective control over the flags and the messages that they convey that would make them government speech.

The city’s program is also not saved by its requirement that private groups wanting to fly their own flags apply for permission and receive approval, thereby – in the city’s view – converting the flags into government speech. “Accepting the City’s rationale,” Shurtleff cautions the justices, “would vastly expand and sanction dangerous aspects of the government-speech doctrine,” allowing the government to stifle unpopular speech.

The Biden administration filed a “friend of the court” brief in which it agrees with Shurtleff that Boston’s “flag-raising program is not government speech, but instead a forum for private speech.” However, it urges the justices to “reaffirm that the First Amendment affords the City and other governments ample latitude to craft expressive programs — including programs involving contributions from private parties — without relinquishing their right to control the message or exclude other private speakers.”

The city disputes the idea that its flagpoles are a public forum. Instead, it contends, the flagpoles are a place for it to convey its own messages, and the public would certainly see them as such. The city only occasionally allows other groups to fly their flags on the third flagpole as part of its community-building efforts, and the city maintains that the program is not the kind of “free for all” open to anyone that Shurtleff depicts.

Because the flags flying on the city’s poles are the city’s speech, the city concludes, it could decline Shurtleff’s request to fly the Camp Constitution flag. Since then, it tells the justices, it has ended the flag-raising program so that it does not have to convey messages that are contrary to its own principles. It is, the city emphasizes, “critically important that governments retain the right and ability to speak on behalf of their constituents and take positions and privilege certain viewpoints when doing so.”

This article was originally published at Howe on the Court.

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How a Bill Becomes a Law

How does a bill become a law? It’s something most people learn the basics of as children at school, but unless you pursue a career in politics or law, it’s very possible that you’ve forgotten the process. It’s important to understand this process because bills are the foundational steps for the laws that govern the United States—it’s how Senators and Members of the House of Representatives propose ideas that could one day become a law in our nation. 

 

To get anywhere in the law-making process, you first need to have an idea of how to make the country either stronger or better. This can be accomplished through creating a new law or revising an existing one and can come from anywhere—not just politicians. 

 

Once there’s an idea in mind or identify a problem that could be fixed through the law, the Members of Congress get to work creating a law that will provide a solution to this problem. They’ll sometimes work together so they can introduce legislation with other Senators. Other times, Senators and Members of the House of Representatives will come together on legislation so that identical or similar bills are introduced in both the House and the Senate. Senators who introduce the bill are its sponsors and primary champions, while Senators who support the bill can become cosponsors. 

 

After introducing the bill, it’s sent to the Senate Parliamentarian to be assigned a committee or committees for deliberation. The chair of the committee can hold a hearing to examine the legislation; during this hearing, committee members invite experts such as policy members to testify on how the bill will impact the country. The committee can then debate, modify, and vote on the bill. If the majority of committee members vote favorably, it’s advanced to the Senate floor.

 

The Majority Leader of the Senate becomes responsible for deciding when to bring legislation for a vote and the type of vote it needs. Non-controversial bills are sometimes hotlined by the Majority Leader and Minority Leader after discussion with their Senate colleagues, passing the legislation by unanimous consent and without a roll-call vote. Most legislation requires more debate, though, and every Senator is given the opportunity to speak either for or against the bill in question. The Majority Leader then schedules a vote with all the Senators once a Closure Vote is made.

 

The House of Representatives, on the other hand, introduces and votes on a companion bill to the one that goes through the Senate. The process is similar to that of the Senate: the House Parliamentarian assigns legislation to a specific committee or committees, where it is then debated and voted on. A law can only be passed if both the Senate and the House of Representatives introduce, debate, and vote on companion pieces of legislation. 

 

The bills will often have minor differences that have to be worked out in a conference committee made up of both Senators and Members of the House. Once this committee resolves any differences in their versions of the bill, there is one final vote in each chamber to approve the final bill’s text. The bill is then sent to the President, who decides whether or not to sign the bill into law. If the President vetos the bill, Congress can attempt to overrule the veto by a two-thirds majority in each chamber.

The post How a Bill Becomes a Law first appeared on Bruce Leal | Law.

from Bruce Leal | Law https://bruceleal.com/how-a-bill-becomes-a-law/
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A quest to reclaim a Pissarro masterpiece hinges on the Erie doctrine

A quest to reclaim a Pissarro masterpiece hinges on the <em>Erie</em> doctrine

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At the beginning of World War II, the heir of a prominent German Jewish art collector was forced to surrender her family’s Camille Pissarro painting to the Nazis. Her heirs have been litigating for more than 15 years over rights to the painting, an Impressionist masterpiece once thought to be lost. Whether they will succeed depends on how the Supreme Court decides a very technical question: Must a federal court hearing state law claims brought under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act apply the state’s choice-of-law rules to determine what substantive law governs the claims at issue, or must it instead use federal common law to choose the source of the substantive law? The justices will hear argument on that question on Tuesday in Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation.

In 1900, Paul Cassirer purchased Pissarro’s 1897 painting Rue Saint-Honoré, Afternoon, Rain Effect. Lilly Cassirer inherited the painting in 1926. In 1939, the painting was expropriated by the Nazis: Lilly was forced to give it up in exchange for permission to flee Germany.

Several members of the Cassirer family, including Lilly and her grandson Claude, ended up in the United States. Other members of the family, including Lilly’s sister Hannah, were murdered in the concentration camps.

In the United States, Lilly filed a claim with the U.S Court of Restitution, which, in 1954, declared her the rightful owner of the painting. In 1958, she reached a settlement with the German Federal Republic for compensation. Germany paid her approximately $13,000; the painting is estimated to be worth about $40 million today. Throughout this time, all parties assumed that the painting was lost or destroyed, although Claude – who remembered playing in the room in which it hung – continued to look for it.

impressionist oil painting showing busy street flanked by large french buildings on rainy day

The full painting. (Thyssen-Bornemisza National Museum)

Unbeknownst to the Cassirer family or the German government, the Pissarro was not lost. In 1951, it was acquired by a California gallery owner, who sold it to a Los Angeles collector. It eventually travelled to New York and then to Saint Louis, Missouri, where it remained until 1976.

That year, Baron Hans Heinrich von Thyssen-Bornemisza purchased the painting and had it shipped to his home in Switzerland. In 1992, he worked with the Spanish government to establish the Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection, a museum in Madrid. He eventually sold the painting to the museum. Neither the baron nor the museum fully investigated the painting’s provenance, despite red flags that it might have been stolen.

Claude Cassirer never stopped looking for the painting. In 1999, he found it listed in a Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection catalog. He promptly filed a petition with Spain and the museum to force the return of the painting. He also pursued diplomatic channels to persuade Spain to return it, but to no avail.

In 2005, after his petition was denied, Claude sued in federal district court in California, where he had lived since 1980. He sued both Spain and the museum, alleging California common law claims including conversion and unlawful possession of personal property, and sought both damages and the return of the painting.

The suit was brought under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. That act both confers original jurisdiction on federal district courts over suits against foreign states (or their instrumentalities) to the extent that they are not entitled to immunity (28 U.S.C. § 1330(a)), and provides that a foreign state or its instrumentality is not immune from suit in any case “in which rights in property taken in violation of international law are in issue” and various other requirements are met (28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3)).

The defendants moved to dismiss. They raised numerous legal and factual issues, including whether the museum was an instrumentality of Spain, whether there was personal jurisdiction over the defendants, whether the elements of Section 1605(a)(3) were met, and whether the suit was timely filed. The district court rejected all of these arguments, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court denied certiorari twice. Along the way, Cassirer voluntarily dismissed Spain as a defendant, leaving only the museum.

Only one issue remained when the district court finally confronted both parties’ motions for summary judgment on the merits: Did the museum somehow acquire good title to the painting? That question turned on whether California law or Spanish law governed. Under California law, thieves of personal property cannot pass good title to anyone, even purchasers in good faith – and thus ownership of the painting was never validly transferred from the Cassirer family. But under Spanish law, good-faith purchasers can acquire valid title to personal property through adverse possession (“usucapio”) if they possess it openly for six years, as the court found that the museum did.

But how should the court decide whether to apply California law or Spanish law? Although choosing between American law and foreign law is seldom necessary, an analogous situation arises frequently when federal court jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship – that is, when the case raises only state-law claims but is in federal court because the parties are citizens of different states (or one party is a citizen of a state and the other is a citizen of a foreign country).

In such cases, the Erie doctrine, established in 1938 in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, requires the application of state law. The 1941 case of Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Co. tells federal courts to choose which state’s law to apply by looking to state choice-of-law doctrines. In other words, the federal district court must apply whatever law a state court in that same state would apply.

What Klaxon means, in short, is that if Cassirer had found the painting in a private gallery in Spain and had sued the owner in California federal court under diversity jurisdiction, the court would have asked whether a California state court would apply California law or Spanish law.

But that’s for cases brought under diversity jurisdiction. What about a case brought under the FSIA instead? Does Klaxon apply? Five U.S. courts of appeals have addressed that question. Four of them – the 2nd, 5th, 6th, and District of Columbia Circuits – have answered in the affirmative. Under the law of those circuits, the court would have applied whatever law a California state court would have applied. The 9th Circuit instead applied a federal common law doctrine (which it had created in an earlier case) regarding choice of law. Applying this 9th Circuit law, the district court held that Spanish law applied, and the 9th Circuit affirmed. The district court alternatively held that California choice-of-law doctrines would also result in the application of Spanish law, but that holding was not addressed by the 9th Circuit.

After 15 years, four trips to the 9th Circuit, and the death of Claude Cassirer (the case is now being litigated by his heirs), the Supreme Court will finally decide whether to apply California or federal common-law choice-of-law doctrines.

Cassirer’s heirs make three main arguments. First, the FSIA states (in 28 U.S.C. § 1606) that when not immune, “the foreign state shall be liable in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.” Because a private gallery would be subject to California’s choice-of-law doctrines, so should the Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection as an instrumentality of a foreign state. Second, Congress enacted the FSIA in light of the background principle of federalism that state law, including state choice-of-law doctrines, should apply to state causes of action, and nothing in the statute indicates any intent to deviate from that principle. Finally, federal common law regarding choice of law is woefully underdeveloped (with only 9th Circuit cases and only in this specific context) and entirely unconstraining.

The United States has filed an amicus brief in support of Cassirer, adding two primary arguments. First, the FSIA was meant to affect only a foreign state’s amenability to suit, not the substantive law applicable to that suit. Second, the brief draws an analogy to the Federal Tort Claims Act, which subjects the federal government to certain tort claims “in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual.” In Richards v. United States, the Supreme Court interpreted that language as mandating the application of state choice-of-law rules – and Congress enacted the FSIA, with its identical language, after Richards.

The museum makes four main arguments. First, the jurisdiction conferred under the FSIA is more analogous to federal question jurisdiction than to diversity jurisdiction, making Erie and its progeny irrelevant. In support of this argument, the museum points to both the text of the statute and the circumstances of its enactment: Congress removed foreign states from ordinary diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and instead created 28 U.S.C. § 1330. The museum also points to Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, in which the Supreme Court upheld the FSIA against a challenge that it exceeded the scope of Article III, finding that cases under the FSIA “arise under” federal law. Second, the “like circumstances” requirement of Section 1606 is irrelevant here, because that applies only to a sovereign’s commercial acts and not to its public acts – acts that involve the exercise of powers peculiar to sovereigns – and “expropriation” is inherently a public act. Third, the application of federal common law is appropriate here because suits under the FSIA implicate foreign policy concerns. Finally, one of the primary purposes of the FSIA was to create uniform standards in suits against foreign sovereigns, which can only be accomplished by applying federal choice-of-law doctrines.

During oral argument, the justices will probably focus on the text of the FSIA and on precedent suggesting that subjects appropriate for federal common lawmaking are few and far between. There will also likely be questions about the remedy: Because the district court, but not the 9th Circuit, found that California’s choice-of-law doctrines would also result in the application of Spanish law, the court might remand for appellate review of that decision. Finally, there might be some discussion of whether to instruct the 9th Circuit to certify the state choice-of-law question to the California Supreme Court, asking that court what law a California court would apply.

And keep in mind that cases under the Erie doctrine have always made strange bedfellows – in the most recent significant case, Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate Insurance Co. in 2010, Justice Antonin Scalia’s plurality opinion was joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Clarence Thomas and Sonia Sotomayor; Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion was joined by Justices Anthony Kennedy, Stephen Breyer, and Samuel Alito.

Whatever the court decides will determine the fate not only of this Pissarro, but of all other litigation under the FSIA. It might also tell us something about the various justices’ attitudes toward federal common law – which is also at issue in another case this term, Egbert v. Boule.

The post A quest to reclaim a Pissarro masterpiece hinges on the <em>Erie</em> doctrine appeared first on SCOTUSblog.

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Justices signal narrow support for allowing equitable tolling of tax deadline

Justices signal narrow support for allowing equitable tolling of tax deadline

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At the argument on Wednesday in Boechler v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, most justices seemed prepared to allow consideration of “equitable tolling” in tax collection due process cases – so long as a decision is written narrowly and does not spill over to support equitable tolling for other tax deadlines.

The case arose after Boechler, P.C., a law firm, sent a petition one day late to request review in the U.S. Tax Court of an IRS notice of determination. The notice of determination, issued by the IRS Independent Office of Appeals after a “collection due process” hearing, had sustained a levy on Boechler’s property to satisfy a $19,250 penalty. The case turns on Section 6330(d)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code, which states that a “person may, within 30 days of a determination under this section, petition the Tax Court for review of such determination (and the Tax Court shall have jurisdiction with respect to such matter).”

The question in Boechler is whether the statute bars a taxpayer who missed the deadline from asserting equitable tolling, which allows courts to excuse missed deadlines in some circumstances. Under applicable precedent, if the statute makes the 30-day time limit jurisdictional, then equitable-tolling claims are barred. The backdrop of Wednesday’s argument also included the statute that requires specific grants of jurisdiction to the Tax Court, which is not an Article III court.

Advocates quickly dove into the details of sentence construction. Melissa Arbus Sherry, arguing for Boechler, contended that the statute’s “vague parenthetical reference” to jurisdiction could not “close those courthouse doors.” Assistant to the Solicitor General Jonathan Bond, arguing for the government, contended that when the language granted jurisdiction over “such matter,” it clearly referred to a “petition that meets both of the first clause’s requirements,” including submission of the petition within 30 days. Yet no comment from the bench fully embraced the government’s argument that the statutory language incontrovertibly made the statute of limitations jurisdictional. At one point, Justice Neil Gorsuch described three possible interpretations, two of which favored the government.

Sherry faced her strongest challenge from Chief Justice John Roberts, who emphasized that the statute includes the statement that a court “shall have jurisdiction.” Why should it matter, Roberts asked, whether that statement is in a parenthetical?

Sherry’s statutory construction argument drew a friendly amendment from Justice Sonia Sotomayor, who suggested that the noun “determination” was the antecedent for “such matter,” rather than the verb “petition” which the briefing had emphasized. (“I’m actually trying to help you,” Sotomayor explained to Sherry. “I’m the one she’s trying to hurt,” interjected Roberts.)

Justice Samuel Alito seemed to agree with Sherry that the placement of the jurisdictional language in the parenthetical was important. He suggested that this might make it “an aside,” as if Congress were saying, “by the way,” the Tax Court has jurisdiction. Justice Elena Kagan asked directly: What would it take to make the statute jurisdictional? Conditional language, such as the use of “if”, is the best way, replied Sherry. But is it the only way?

In the course of the government’s argument, Justice Amy Coney Barrett pressed on the meaning of a “clear statement rule,” by asking what should happen if “the government’s interpretation is maybe a little bit more plausible but not a slam dunk”? Bond responded that a statute should be treated as a clear statement barring equitable tolling if the court decided that was the most reasonable reading – at least, as long as the statutory section had the word “jurisdiction” in it. But the approach of suggesting that a statute containing the word “jurisdiction” is clearly jurisdictional unless it is ambiguous did not seem persuasive for most justices. Justices Brett Kavanaugh and Stephen Breyer even suggested that the Treasury Department and the solicitor general’s office might help inform Congress of the content of the court’s clear-statement jurisprudence, in order to encourage better drafting.

Justice Clarence Thomas raised the point that a subsequent statutory subsection, 26 U.S.C. § 6330(e)(1), says that the Tax Court has jurisdiction to enjoin an action only if an appeal is “timely.” Why, Thomas asked, would Congress permit the Tax Court “to consider an untimely action but then not allow it to enjoin a levy?” Bond argued that “timely” meant that the petition had been submitted within the 30-day period, while Sherry argued that “timely” incorporates the possibility of tolling. Breyer took Sherry’s side with the help of a law dictionary definition. If a court “extended the legal deadline,” said Breyer, “therefore, it is timely.”

The argument also tested the idea that a decision in favor of Boechler could have a narrow scope. When Thomas asked for numbers, Bond replied that the new precedent would have relevance for about 26,000 “collection due process” cases per year. Of those 26,000 cases, 1,200 produce taxpayer petitions for Tax Court review and 300 are dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. When Kavanaugh asked whether equitable tolling should be “pretty tightly cabined,” Sherry responded that the court’s recent precedent on the standard for equitable tolling would apply in “exactly the same” way here.

Kavanaugh also asked about the impact of a Boechler decision on other tax statutes of limitations, in particular Section 6213(a), which provides the gateway to, Bond said, 95% of the Tax Court’s docket and gives a taxpayer 90 days to petition for Tax Court review of a notice of deficiency. Bond said that a Boechler decision would not disturb the precedent holding that Section 6213(a)’s deadline cannot be equitably tolled.

Sherry also developed the argument that the collection due process procedure is “equitable at every turn.” She argued that CDP focuses on the equities of a particular taxpayer’s situation because it focuses on “collection alternatives,” which might, for instance, allow a taxpayer to establish a repayment schedule rather than permitting the IRS to seize and sell property to pay tax debts. Bond’s counterargument – that Congress specified only tolling exceptions that the IRS can more easily administer, for instance for bankruptcy and combat-zone military service – seemed to fall flat.

The Boechler argument suggests that most of the justices lean toward allowing the consideration of equitable tolling in the specific context of tax CDP proceedings. A majority may find dispositive the principle of insisting upon and encouraging clearer statutory language from Congress. Some justices may also consider the equitable nature of collection due process proceedings an important point in the firm’s favor. When the court puts these two considerations together, a narrow decision in favor of Boechler will likely result.

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Reductions on deductions and state courts on out-of-state businesses

Reductions on deductions and state courts on out-of-state businesses

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This week we highlight cert petitions that ask the Supreme Court to consider, among other things, whether a 2017 law’s cap of $10,000 for the deduction for state and local taxes on federal income returns violates the Constitution by coercing states’ tax policies, and whether state courts can exercise jurisdiction over out-of-state businesses on the basis of their registration as foreign corporations.

The 2017 cap on the federal tax deduction for state and local taxes

New York v. Yellen addresses the Constitution’s allocation of taxing authority between the federal and state governments. In 2017, Congress passed a tax law that allowed taxpayers to deduct from federal income taxation only up to $10,000 of state and local taxes. Previously, taxpayers could deduct all or nearly all state and local taxes — and in 2015, the average deduction for state and local taxes claimed by the 3.3 million New Yorkers who itemized their deductions on their federal tax returns was $21,943. Then-President Donald Trump described the 2017 law as an “incentive” for taxpayers “to say, hey, make sure that your politicians do a good job of running your state.” New York, Connecticut, Maryland, and New Jersey filed suit, arguing that the new law violated the Constitution — specifically, Article I, Section 8, and the 10th and 16th Amendments — because it interfered with states’ sovereign taxing authority by unduly coercing them to change their sovereign tax policies and by denying them equal sovereignty.

The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York rejected the states’ claims, ruling that the negative economic effects of the $10,000 cap were not so severe as to impermissibly coerce the states into changing their policies. The district court also ruled that a flat dollar cap on the deduction was not unlawful. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit affirmed, concluding that Congress had the constitutional authority even to eliminate the deduction. In their petition, the states maintain that the 2017 law diverges from 150 years of history and introduces a novel question about federal taxing power.

State courts’ general jurisdiction over out-of-state businesses

In Cooper Tire & Rubber Company v. McCall, a tire manufacturer resists Georgia courts’ exercise of jurisdiction on the basis of its compliance with Georgia’s registration statute for foreign corporations. Tyrance McCall, a Florida resident, sued Cooper Tire & Rubber Company, a Delaware corporation with its headquarters in Ohio, after a 2016 accident in Florida resulting from the alleged failure of a tire that Cooper manufactured in Arkansas. Cooper’s activities in Georgia had no connection to McCall’s claims against Cooper, meaning that Georgia courts lacked “specific jurisdiction” over Cooper (the jurisdictional issue in last term’s Ford Motor Company v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court). Instead, the Georgia Supreme Court upheld “general jurisdiction” over Cooper on the ground that Cooper, by registering as a foreign corporation in Georgia, had consented to suit in Georgia as a condition of doing business in the state. Even though the Georgia Supreme Court acknowledged recent case law from the Supreme Court that a corporation consents to general jurisdiction in the states where it is incorporated (here, Delaware) and has its headquarters (here, Ohio), the court ruled that the Supreme Court had not formally overruled earlier case law supporting the theory that registration supports general jurisdiction.

These and other petitions of the week are below:

Thacker v. United States
21-877
Issue: Whether a district court may consider the 2018 amendment to the sentences mandated by 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) in determining whether a defendant has shown “extraordinary and compelling reasons” warranting a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).

Gore v. Oklahoma
21-883
Issue: Whether McGirt v. Oklahoma applies retroactively to convictions that were final when McGirt was decided.

Martin v. Johnson
21-896
Issue: Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit violated the backward-looking nature of Section 2254(d) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 and the clear mandates announced by the Supreme Court in Sexton v. Beaudreaux, Cullen v. Pinholster, and Harrington v. Richter when it considered — and based its ultimate decision upon — an argument the respondent, Alonzo Cortez Johnson, never made to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals on direct appeal.

Cooper Tire & Rubber Company v. McCall
21-926
Issue: Whether the due process clause of the 14th Amendment permits a state to assert personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state corporation, for claims not arising from or related to any contacts between the corporation and the forum state, on the ground that the corporation’s registration to do business in the state is deemed consent to general jurisdiction there.

Stirling v. Stokes
21-938
Issues: (1) Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit violated basic principles of Strickland v. Washington when it failed to reweigh the whole of the evidence in its prejudice analysis in Sammie Stokes’ habeas action to determine if there was a reasonable probability of a different result; (2) whether the 4th Circuit erred in granting relief on a defaulted ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim when trial counsel had reasonable strategic reasons not to pursue a “bad upbringing” mitigation defense and collateral counsel had reasonable strategic reasons not to pursue an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim; and (3) alternatively, whether this case should be held pending the outcome of Shinn v. Ramirez, argued Dec. 8, 2021.

New York v. Yellen
21-966
Issue: Whether Congress’s imposition of a $10,000 cap on the deduction of state and local property and income taxes from federal taxable income violates Article I, Section 8 and the 10th and 16th Amendments of the United States Constitution.

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Court will take up five new cases, including lawsuit from football coach who wanted to pray on the field

Court will take up five new cases, including lawsuit from football coach who wanted to pray on the field

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In a term in which the justices are already slated to weigh in on disputes over public funding for private schools that teach religion, the role of spiritual advisers in the execution chamber, and the flying of a religious flag on a city flag pole, the Supreme Court on Friday added another religion case to its docket. The justices agreed to hear the case of a high school football coach who wanted to pray at mid-field after games. The justices granted review in Kennedy v. Bremerton School District, along with four other cases, in an order list issued after their private conference on Friday.

The justices did not act on several of the other high-profile petitions for review that they considered on Friday, involving (among other issues) whether affirmative action in higher education violates federal law, whether a website designer can opt out of a non-discrimination law and refuse to create custom sites for same-sex weddings, and whether the court should overrule its 2020 decision holding that a large portion of eastern Oklahoma remains a reservation for purposes of federal criminal law. The justices could still take up those cases later, but their failure to do so on Friday means that even if they do, they are unlikely to hear oral arguments until the 2022-23 term.

The justices, however, likely will schedule arguments this term in the five new cases that they granted. The case of the football coach involves Joseph Kennedy, a practicing Christian whose religious beliefs require him to “give thanks through prayer, at the end of each game.” When he began his job as an assistant coach at Bremerton High School, a public school in Washington state, he initially prayed alone after games, but over time some of his players – and eventually a majority of the team – joined him. One parent complained that his son, a player on the team, felt like he had to join in the prayer, even though he was an atheist, or face a loss of playing time.

The school district ordered Kennedy to stop praying so that the district did not violate the Constitution’s establishment clause, which prohibits the government from favoring one religion over another. Kennedy announced that he would not comply, prompting a large gathering of people – including parents, a state legislator, and members of both teams – to join him at the 50-yard line after a game in October 2015 to support him.

The school district offered to try to accommodate Kennedy by, for example, giving him a private space to pray or allowing him to pray after the crowd had left the stadium. But Kennedy and his lawyers declined those offers, and after Kennedy prayed on the field again following two more games, the school district placed Kennedy on paid administrative leave.

During a performance review that year, the head football coach recommended that Kennedy not be rehired because (among other things) he had not followed the school district’s policy, and Kennedy did not apply for a coaching position. Instead, he filed a lawsuit in federal district court, arguing that the school district had violated his First Amendment rights and federal civil rights laws.

Kennedy came to the Supreme Court in 2018 seeking to get his job back while litigation continued. The court turned him down, but Justice Samuel Alito penned a statement regarding that denial that was joined by Justices Clarence Thomas, Neil Gorsuch, and Brett Kavanaugh. Alito wrote that Kennedy’s free-speech claim raised important issues, and he suggested the case may warrant review in the future.

The district court ruled against Kennedy, holding that that “sole reason” the school district restricted Kennedy from praying was to avoid a violation of the establishment clause. A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit upheld that decision. It explained that although “there are numerous close cases chronicled in the Supreme Court’s and our current Establishment Clause caselaw, this is not one of them.” A divided 9th Circuit rejected Kennedy’s plea to have the full court rehear the case.

Kennedy returned to the Supreme Court in September 2021, telling the justices that the 9th Circuit’s ruling used “imagined Establishment Clause concerns to inflict real Free Exercise Clause damage.” “The religious expression of hundreds of thousands of teachers in the Ninth Circuit is now on the verge of extinction,” he contended. Moreover, Kennedy added, the ruling’s “chilling effects elsewhere around the country are palpable, as the Ninth Circuit essentially held” Kennedy’s “efforts to publicize the denial of his constitutional rights against him.”

Kennedy’s “brief, quiet prayer” was private speech, the coach insisted, and not part of his job; the school district has no interest at all in eliminating it. The district, he argued, would not have violated the establishment clause by allowing him to pray after the games.

The school district countered that whether Kennedy has the right to a “brief, quiet prayer by himself while at school” “is entirely beside the point” – particularly when, the district insisted, “every word of that description is wrong.” The dispute before the court, it stressed, is “about a school district’s authority to protect students when its employee does not work with it to find a reasonable accommodation.” A ruling for Kennedy, the school district warned, would require the Supreme Court “to overturn decades of settled law under both the Free Speech and Establishment Clauses.”

The justices agreed on Friday to take up four other cases:

  • George v. McDonough, in which the court will consider whether a denial of a veteran’s claim for benefits that relies on an agency interpretation that is later deemed invalid is the kind of “clear and unmistakable error” that allows the veteran to challenge an otherwise-final decision.
  • Vega v. Tekoh, involving whether a plaintiff can bring a federal civil rights claim against a police officer based on the officer’s failure to provide a Miranda
  • Nance v. Ward, involving the procedures by which an inmate must raise his challenge to the method by which the state intends to execute him.
  • Shoop v. Twyford, involving (among other things) whether a court must determine whether evidence would help an inmate seeking a writ of habeas corpus and whether the court can consider that evidence before the court grants an order allowing the inmate to develop new evidence.

The cases granted on Friday are likely to be argued in the court’s April argument session. We expect more orders from Friday’s conference (although not necessarily more grants) on Tuesday, Jan. 19, at 9:30 a.m.

This article was originally published at Howe on the Court.

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from SCOTUSblog https://www.scotusblog.com/2022/01/court-will-take-up-five-new-cases-including-lawsuit-from-football-coach-who-wanted-to-pray-on-the-field/
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Justices limit Social Security benefits of “dual-status” technicians in National Guard

Justices limit Social Security benefits of “dual-status” technicians in National Guard

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Thursday’s decision in Babcock v. Kijakazi resolved a technical question about the Social Security benefits available to a small group of National Guard workers: pre-1984 dual-status military technicians. By an 8-1 vote, the court approved the government’s decision to exclude those workers from a statutory benefit limited to members of the “uniformed services.”

The case involved details of the formula that the Social Security statutes use to calculate monthly benefits. That formula has a special rule that limits Social Security benefits for people with irregular work histories over the course of their lifetime in cases in which they are likely to be receiving pensions for work outside the Social Security system (often work for government or military employers). That limiting rule has an exception, so that the limitation does not apply to payments that are “based wholly on service as a member of a uniformed service.”

The question in Babcock was whether “dual-status military technicians” hired before 1984 did their work “wholly … as a member of a uniformed service,” and Justice Amy Coney Barrett’s succinct opinion holds that they did not. She explains that the employees have a dual status because the relevant statutes describe them as “civilian employee[s]” in the work that they do – principally related to training and managing the National Guard supply chain – but require all who hold the position to “maintain membership” in the National Guard, which is one of the “uniformed service[s]” to which the protection applies. She goes to explain that the technicians during the relevant years received a civil-service pension from the Office of Personnel Management for their work as technicians, but also a military pension from the Defense Finance and Accounting Service for their work in National Guard duties. The case involved only the civil-service pension; all agree that the limitation protects the military pension.

Barrett’s opinion presents the result as compelled by the statutory description of the protection, which limits it to payments “based wholly on service as a member of a uniformed service” (my emphasis). She refers to dictionaries describing the use of “as” to be read “most naturally … to mean ‘in the role, capacity, or function of.’” Because the status of these technicians “is that of a civilian, not a member of the National Guard,” their work as technicians (as distinct from their work in National Guard duties) is not work in their capacity “as” members of the National Guard.

The strongest argument for David Babcock, who worked as a dual-status technician from 1975 to 2009 and challenged the government’s reduction to his Social Security benefits, is the requirement that he be a member of the National Guard at all times while he was employed as one of these technicians; indeed, these technicians even wear military uniforms at work. But Barrett finds that argument futile, commenting that “[a] condition of employment is not the same as the capacity in which one serves.” Summarizing, she concludes that “[d]etermining whether Babcock’s technician employment was service ‘as’ a member of the National Guard does not turn on factors like whether he wore his uniform to work. It turns on how Congress classified his job — and … Congress classified dual-status technicians as civilians.” She acknowledges that the congressional classification might seem at first to be a “bookkeeping” technicality, but says that “bookkeeping matters when it comes to pay and benefits.”

Neither the opinion nor the result will surprise anybody familiar with the argument. My article summarizing the argument described a bench mostly unsympathetic with Babcock, with the sole exception of Justice Neil Gorsuch. His brief dissent is all that kept Barrett’s opinion from unanimity.

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from SCOTUSblog https://www.scotusblog.com/2022/01/justices-limit-social-security-benefits-of-dual-status-technicians-in-national-guard/
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The morning read for Friday, Jan. 14

The morning read for Friday, Jan. 14

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Each weekday, we select a short list of news articles, commentary, and other noteworthy links related to the Supreme Court. To suggest a piece for us to consider, email us at roundup@scotusblog.com.

Here’s the Friday morning read:

The post The morning read for Friday, Jan. 14 appeared first on SCOTUSblog.

from SCOTUSblog https://www.scotusblog.com/2022/01/the-morning-read-for-friday-jan-14/
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Fractured court blocks vaccine-or-test requirement for large workplaces but green-lights vaccine mandate for health care workers

Fractured court blocks vaccine-or-test requirement for large workplaces but green-lights vaccine mandate for health care workers

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With COVID-19 cases and hospitalizations reaching a new record high as a result of the Omicron variant, the Supreme Court on Thursday put the Biden administration’s vaccine-or-test mandate for large employers on hold, while litigation over its legality continues in the lower courts. Over a dissent from the court’s three liberal justices, the court ruled that the Occupational Safety and Health Administration exceeded its power in issuing the mandate. Congress may have given OSHA the power to regulate workplace dangers, the court explained, but it “has not given that agency the power to regulate public health more broadly.” At the same time, the justices – by a vote of 5-4 – granted the administration’s request to be allowed to temporarily enforce a vaccine mandate for health care workers at facilities that receive federal funding.

The orders that the justices issued on Thursday afternoon were the latest chapter in the fast-moving vaccine disputes. After the cases came to the Supreme Court in December on an emergency basis, the justices opted to expedite the cases for oral argument on whether the mandates can remain in place while the challenges proceed in the lower courts. The court heard nearly four hours of arguments on the policies on Jan. 7 and issued a pair of unsigned opinions just six days later.

The OSHA case

OSHA issued the vaccine-or-test mandate at the center of National Federation of Independent Business v. Department of Labor in November. It required all employers with 100 or more employees – roughly two-thirds of the private sector – to compel those employees to either be fully vaccinated against COVID-19 or to be tested weekly and wear masks at work. The government expected the mandate to cover 84 million workers.

Businesses, states, and nonprofits went to court to challenge the mandate, and on Thursday the Supreme Court granted their request to put it on hold. Describing the mandate as a “significant encroachment into the lives — and health — of a vast number of employees,” the court emphasized that Congress must speak clearly if it intends to give a federal agency the authority to “exercise powers of vast economic and political significance.”

In this case, the court continued, Congress did not. It gave the Department of Labor the power to establish safety standards for the workplace, rather than “broad public health measures.” Although COVID-19 “is a risk that occurs in many workplaces,” the court acknowledged, it isn’t a risk that workers encounter simply by virtue of being at work – COVID-19 spreads virtually anywhere that people gather. “Permitting OSHA to regulate the hazards of daily life — simply because most Americans have jobs and face those same risks while on the clock — would significantly expand OSHA’s regulatory authority without clear congressional authorization,” the court concluded. And indeed, the court noted, the fact that OSHA has never adopted a similar regulation is a “telling indication” that the vaccine-or-test mandate exceeds the agency’s power.

The court then turned briefly to each side’s description of the effects of the policy. The challengers, the court observed, contended that the mandate would cost the states and employers billions of dollars and would prompt hundreds of thousands of employees to quit. The Biden administration, on the other hand, argued that the mandate would “save over 6,500 lives and prevent hundreds of thousands of hospitalizations.” But in the end, the court posited, other government actors – who are politically accountable – must “weigh such tradeoffs,” rather than the justices.

Justices Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan penned a rare joint dissent in which they complained that employees, “more than any others,” have “little control, and therefore little capacity to mitigate risk” from the spread of COVID-19. The majority’s ruling, they contended, “stymies the Federal Government’s ability to counter the unparalleled threat that COVID-19 poses to our Nation’s workers.”

The dissenters tackled the same question that was at the heart of a concurring opinion filed by Justice Neil Gorsuch (and joined by Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito): Who should decide how to respond to the pandemic? For Gorsuch, the “answer is clear”: the states and Congress. The dissenters reached a very different conclusion: OSHA, with its expertise in workplace safety and its status as a politically accountable government agency, is better suited to make decisions about how to protect workers from COVID-19 than “a court, lacking any knowledge of how to safeguard workplaces, and insulated from responsibility for any damage it causes.”

The vaccine-or-test mandate will remain on hold while the challenges to its legality continue in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit.

The health care vaccine case

In Biden v. Missouri, the justices agreed to allow the Biden administration to enforce nationwide a rule that requires nearly all health care workers at facilities that participate in the Medicare and Medicaid programs to be fully vaccinated against COVID-19 unless they qualify for a medical or religious exemption. The Department of Health and Human Services issued the rule, which applies to more than 17 million workers, in November, but two federal district courts – in Missouri and Louisiana – put the rule on hold in roughly half the states.

In an unsigned opinion, the court emphasized that a key responsibility of the Department of Health and Human Services is “to ensure that the healthcare providers who care for Medicare and Medicaid patients protect their patients’ health and safety.” To do so, HHS has long required those providers to comply with a variety of conditions if they want to receive Medicare and Medicaid funding. Because COVID-19 “is a highly contagious, dangerous, and — especially for Medicare and Medicaid patients — deadly disease,” HHS determined that a vaccine mandate was necessary to protect patients because it would decrease the chances that health care workers would both contract the virus and pass it on to their patients. Such a mandate, the court wrote, “fits neatly within” the power given to HHS by Congress.

Justice Clarence Thomas filed a dissenting opinion that was joined by Alito, Gorsuch, and Justice Amy Coney Barrett. Thomas complained that the Biden administration “proposes to find virtually unlimited vaccination power, over millions of healthcare workers, in” what he described as a “hodgepodge” of statutes – “in definitional provisions, a saving clause, and a provision regarding long-term care facilities’ sanitation procedures.” The Biden administration had not adequately explained, as far as Thomas was concerned, why Congress would have given HHS such power in relatively minor provisions. And indeed, Thomas noted, if Congress had wanted to give HHS the power to impose a vaccine mandate, “it would have done what it has done elsewhere — specifically authorize one.”

This article was originally published at Howe on the Court. 

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